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Using harmonised data from the European Union Household Panel, we analyse gender 
pay gaps by sector across the wages distribution for eleven countries. We find that the 
mean gender pay gap in the raw data typically hides large variations in the gap across the 
wages distribution. We use quantile regression techniques to control for the effects of 
individual and job characteristics at different points of the distribution, and calculate the 
part of the gap attributable to differing returns between men and women. We find that, 
first, gender pay gaps are typically bigger at the top of the wage distribution, a finding 
that is consistent with the existence of glass ceilings. Second, for some countries gender 
pay gaps are also bigger at the bottom of the wage distribution, a finding that is consistent 
with sticky floors. Third, the gender pay gap is typically higher at the top than the bottom 
end of the wage distribution, suggesting that glass ceilings are more prevalent than sticky 
floors. Fourth, the gender pay gap differs significantly across the public and the private 
sector wages distribution for each of our EU countries. 
 
 
Keywords: glass ceilings, sticky floors, quantile regression, public sector, gender pay 
gaps. 
 






    1. INTRODUCTION   
 
While the mean gender wage gap has been extensively studied in the labour economics 
literature, only relatively recently has attention shifted to investigating the degree to 
which the gender gap might vary across the wages distribution and why. Albrecht, 
Bjorklund and Vroman (2003) use 1998 data for Sweden and show that the gender wage 
gap is increasing throughout the wage distribution and accelerating at the top, and they 
interpret this as evidence of a glass ceiling in Sweden. de la Rica, Dolado and Llorens 
(2005) undertake a similar analysis using 1999 data for Spain. They stratify their sample 
by education group and find that the gender wage gap is expanding over the wage 
distribution only for the group with college/tertiary education. For less educated groups, 
the gender wage gap is wider at the bottom than the top. Thus in Spain for the more 
educated there is a glass ceiling while for the less educated there is not. Using a different 
decomposition methodology in the quantile regressions framework and Spanish data for 
1995, del Rio, Gradin and Canto (2005) obtain similar results to de la Rica et. al. 
 
The purpose of our paper is to investigate these issues further in order to see if 
the glass ceiling phenomenon is prevalent across pre-enlargement Europe. Using 
harmonised data from the European Union Household Panel, we analyse gender pay 
gaps across the wages distribution for eleven countries utilizing the quantile regression 
(QR) framework. We investigate the extent to which gender affects the location, scale 
and shape of the conditional wage distribution, and whether or not these patterns differ 
across the public and private sectors.  
We first chart the gender pay gap using raw data and then compare the raw 
gender gaps with estimates which control for men’s and women’s attributes using the 
QR framework. This enables us to answer the question of how much of the observed 
gender pay gaps are attributable to differing returns.  Unlike ordinary least squares 
  1(OLS), QR methods allow for the possibility that characteristics may have different 
returns at different points of the distribution. We find that, for some of our countries in 
both the public and private sectors, the gender wage gap is typically wider at the top and 
occasionally also wider at the bottom of the wage distribution.  Following Albrecht et al 
(2003), we interpret the gender wage gap at the top of the wage distribution as a glass 
ceiling.  At the bottom of the wage distribution, for some of our EU countries, we also 
find that the gender pay gap widens significantly. We define this phenomenon as a sticky 
floor.
1 We find that differences in returns account for a large part of the variation in the 
gender pay gap across the wages distribution. In Section 4 of the paper we discuss 
various hypotheses that could explain the empirical findings. 
2. THE DATA, VARIABLES AND RAW GENDER WAGE GAP 
Our data are from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), a large-scale 
survey conducted annually from 1994 to 2001. The ECHP was specifically designed to 
be harmonised at the input stage: in most countries a standard questionnaire was used, 
with harmonised definitions and sampling criteria. Although a standardised 
questionnaire does not overcome the nuances of interpretation and meaning between 
different languages, the harmonised format greatly facilitates cross-country comparisons. 
We include in our analysis the eleven European countries listed in Table 1. We omit 
Greece and Portugal from our estimation owing to apparent gaps in the training data and 
because of the smaller estimating sub-samples with usable information. The ECHP data 
for Britain and Germany were adapted from their existing national household surveys, 
                                                 
1 Booth, Francesconi and Frank (2003) first defined a sticky floor as the situation arising where otherwise identical 
men and women might be appointed to the same pay scale or rank, but the women are appointed at the bottom and 
men further up the scale. Such a strategy can evade some discrimination laws, since the appointment rank is the 
same. Here we use the term more generally to describe the situation where the gender pay gap widens at the bottom 
of the wages distribution, as will be further explained below.  
  2while the other countries used the full harmonised questionnaire. Sample sizes are 
reported in column [5] of Appendix Table A.1.   
The education, industry and occupation variables are all coded according to 
standard, internationally comparable definitions. Education levels are defined according 
to UNESCO’s International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED). ISCED was 
intended for education policy analysis and was designed to be invariant to differences in 
national education systems.
2 The ECHP distinguishes between education completed to 
the lower secondary stage (ISCED 0-2), upper secondary education (ISCED 3) and post-
secondary or tertiary education (ISCED 5-7). The data on industrial sector are 
categorised according to the European Union’s Classification of Economic Activities in 
the European Community (NACE), while occupation is defined using the International 
Standard Classification of Occupation (ISCO-88). The Data Appendix lists the 
occupation and industry groups. 
We initially estimated the gender pay gap separately for waves 2 and 8, in order 
to chart any changes that might have occurred between 1995 and 2001. Since there was 
little difference between the two sets of estimates, in our main model we estimate the 
gender gap over the entire sample of waves 2 to 8 inclusive,
3 pooling all the waves and 
also including wave dummies as explanatory variables in addition to the usual set of 
exogenous variables. For the pooled sample we do not require individuals to be present 
in all waves or in consecutive waves. We therefore have new entrants across waves, and 
                                                 
2  For details, see http://www.unesco.org/education/information/nfsunesco/doc/isced_1997.htm 
3  We omitted wave 1 because first, it does not contain information about whether or not the respondent’s employment 
contract was fixed term / casual. If temporary contract coverage varies between men and women, temporary 
contracts could be an important determinant of the gender wage gap. Second, the deflator used (the EU harmonised 
index of consumer prices, from Eurostat) is only available from wave 2. Also note that Austria did not join the 
ECHP until wave 2 and that Finland did not join until wave 3 (following its accession to the EU in 1995). Thus, we 
have seven waves of data for all countries except Finland, for which we have 6 waves. 
  3we lose some individuals through attrition. Thus we have a changing composition of 
individuals. As reported in the final column of Table A.1, respondents are typically 
present in the panel for 4 waves. As we discuss below, we account for multiple 
observations on the same individuals in the calculation of the standard errors. 
Because we wish to avoid conflating issues to do with gender and early 
educational enrolments, we exclude from our analysis individuals under the age of 22 
years, and paid apprentices and those on special employment-related training schemes 
(who account for less than 1% of the sampled age group).  Amongst older workers there 
may also be differential withdrawal from the labour force, depending, for example, on 
how early retirement schemes operate. We therefore exclude workers of 55 years and 
over. For each country, our estimating sub-samples – stratified by gender – comprise 
full-time and part-time public and private sector employees who are: (i) between the 
ages of 22-54 years inclusive; (ii) working at least 15 hours per week; (iii) not employed 
in agriculture; and (iv) with valid observations on all the variables used in the wage 
equations. The restriction of working at least 15 hours per week was necessary because 
of the nature of the ECHP data, where – in the first two waves – we were unable to 
distinguish individuals regularly working fewer than 15 hours from those out-of-the 
labour force. In addition, for those working fewer than 15 hours, the ECHP across all 
waves provides no information on firm size, public/private sector or tenure. Thus our 
estimating sub-samples will under-represent low-hours part-timers.
4
                                                 
4  For most countries, low-hours part-timers represent only a tiny fraction of workers. Exceptions are Britain (6.4% of 
the sub-sample), Denmark (3.2%), the Netherlands (9.8%) and Ireland (4.0%). In all other countries the proportion 
of low-hours part-timers is under 3%.  
  4The dependent variable is the log of the average hourly wage, including overtime 
payments, in the respondent’s main job, deflated to 2001 prices.
5 The deflators are the 
European Union’s harmonised indices of consumer prices (HICP; see Eurostat Yearbook 
2003).  The ECHP provide a rich set of controls, which are listed in the notes under 
Table 2. Unfortunately, the ECHP does not collect any information on either union 
status or union coverage, and so we are unable to control for this in our estimation. The 
data do not contain information on labour market experience, but we do include tenure 
(6 categories) and a binary indicator denoting whether the individual has had a spell of 
unemployment since 1989, which should capture some of the variation in workers’ 
labour market attachment.  
Throughout, we estimate our models for three sub-samples of data: a combined 
sample comprising both public and private sector workers, and then two disaggregated 
sub-samples, comprising public and private sector workers respectively. In the 
remainder of this section, we discuss the estimates of the raw gender wage gap for all 
three samples and then briefly present the methodology used to estimate the gender 
wage gap.   
Table 1 reports estimates of the raw gender wage gap by country. The raw gap 
for the combined sample appears in Panel A (this combines public and private sector 
workers), for public sector workers in Panel B, and for private sector workers in Panel C.  
Column [1] of Table 1 indicates the male percentage of the various sub-samples 
by country. From Panel A, we see that men form the majority of the workforce in all 
countries except Finland. Britain and Denmark have a very similar gender composition, 
at 50.5% and 50.8% respectively. Spain has the highest male proportion, at 62.2% of 
                                                 
5  The log wage was calculated from the ECHP variables as log (wage) = log (PI211MG * (12/52) / PE005A) = log 
(normal gross monthly earnings from main job including overtime * (12/52) / hours in main job including 
overtime). No specific information is provided on overtime hours and premia. 
  5employees. The Netherlands is a close second, at 59.7%, followed by Italy at 59.3%.  
The mean raw gender gap is presented in Column [2]. Inspection of Columns [3] to [7] 
reveals that in three countries – Ireland, Italy and Spain – the raw gender gap is 
decreasing as we move from the 10
th to the 90
th percentiles.  These raw gaps are also 
illustrated in Figure 1. In contrast, there is a striking increase of 15-16 percentage points 
as we shift from the 10
th to the 90
th percentiles in Finland and from the 50
th to the 90
th 
percentiles in Denmark. For Britain, while the raw gender wage gap is rather large (its 
mean is 24.6%), it is relatively constant across the distribution.  
This simple comparison suggests there is considerable heterogeneity across our 
EU countries. It also shows that measuring the gender pay gap at the mean of each 
distribution (that is, comparing an ‘average’ woman with an ‘average’ man) can produce 
a misleadingly simple picture of how men’s and women’s wages differ. This mean gap 
can hide larger or smaller gaps between high-paid men and women, or between low-paid 
men and women.
6  
Next consider the raw gaps for the public sector, presented in Panel B. We were 
interested in stratifying our sample by sector because institutions in the public and 
private sector are typically very different. In the public sector, organisations are largely 
                                                 
6 Overall wage inequality differs substantially across countries. In our data, the countries with the most compressed 
raw log hourly wage distributions (public and private sectors combined) are Denmark followed by Italy, the 
Netherlands, Finland and Belgium, and then Austria. The country with the most unequal wages distribution is 
Ireland, followed by Spain, Britain and France and Germany. The 90
th-10
th percentile differentials of the raw log 
wage distributions are: Austria 0.94 log points; Belgium 0.90 log points; Britain 1.20 log points; Denmark 0.72 log 
points; Finland 0.90 log points; France 1.13 log points; Germany 1.01 log points; Ireland 1.32 log points; Italy 0.88 
log points; Netherlands 0.89 log points; and Spain 1.30 log points. Although calculated from our samples of prime-
aged workers, these figures are reasonably close to the 90-10 log wage differentials reported by Blau and Kahn 
(1996), whose sample included 4 of the countries considered here, and in OECD (1996). Both these studies used 
different data to those used here. 
  6non-profit and thus isolated from the rigours of the market economy. Thus, in principle, 
they could more easily follow “tastes for discrimination” in their wage-setting 
behaviour.  However, they are also subject to government objectives and policies. The 
European Union countries have adopted strong positions in favour of equal opportunities 
and it is likely that these might be more enforced in the public sector. We tested to see if 
this is a valid separation by utilizing simple OLS pooling tests, which in every country 
rejected joint equality of the public-private sector coefficients. 
As Column [1] in Panel B shows, the public sector has a majority female 
workforce in seven of our eleven countries. Only in Austria, Ireland, Italy and Spain are 
men in the majority in the public sector, and even in these countries, the majority is slim 
(the highest proportion of men is 52.7% in Spain). In the private sector, on the other 
hand (see Panel C), men predominate across all countries, and in six countries they 
account for over 60% of the private sector workforce. 
The raw wage gap measured at the mean (Column [2] Table 1) is generally 
higher in the private sector than in the public sector.  While the raw average gender 
wage gap in the public sector is in excess of 20% in Britain, Finland and the 
Netherlands, in Belgium, Italy and Spain it is under 10%, and indeed in Italy it is found 
to be insignificantly different from zero.  In contrast, in the private sector, the raw 
average gender gap exceeds 13% in all countries and in Britain and Austria, it is found 
to be close to 30%. In France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands and Spain the gap is 
around or over 20%. How does the raw gender wage gap vary across the unconditional 
distribution?  In the public sector, Italy is the only country where the raw gender gap is 
found to be insignificant in all parts of the distribution except at the top (see Column 
[7]), where it is still very much smaller (at about 5%) than other countries.  In Finland 
and the Netherlands, the raw gap increases monotonically as we move up the 
  7unconditional wage distributions, and in Belgium, Denmark and Germany, the gap is 
also higher toward the top of the distribution. In Ireland and Spain, the gap moves in the 
opposite direction.  In Britain, the raw gap is remarkably similar at about 20% across 
different parts of the distribution. These raw gaps by sector are also illustrated in Figure 
2. 
We find similar patterns in the private sector too (the raw gaps for the private 
sector are presented in Panel C of Table 1). Britain exhibits a similar wage gap along the 
distribution. The gender gap increases moving up the wage distribution in Finland and 
Netherlands, and is also higher toward the top in Belgium, Denmark, France and Ireland. 
In contrast to what is found in the public sector in Italy, the wage gap is now 
significantly different from zero and is U-shaped. We find a similar pattern in Germany.  
In summary, we find that in both the public and the private sectors there is a 
tendency in some countries for the gender wage gap to be higher at the top of the wage 
distribution relative to the middle parts of the distribution, hinting at a possible ‘glass-
ceiling’ effect.  However, the gender wage gap is also wider at the bottom end too for 
public sector workers in six countries (Austria, Britain, Denmark, France and Spain), 
and for private sector workers in four countries (France, Germany, Italy and Spain). This 
hints at a ‘sticky floor’ effect for some countries. But these are only raw gender gaps. In 
order to find out how much of the observed raw wage gap can be explained by the 
differences in the returns to various characteristics, we next turn to the quantile 
regression results.    
3.  WAGE GAP ESTIMATES FROM QUANTILE REGRESSIONS  
(a) The Econometric Model 
 
There is now an extensive literature that estimates gender pay gaps using a 
decomposition of the linear regression framework first introduced by Blinder (1973) and 
  8Oaxaca (1973). In this framework, log-linear wage regressions are estimated using the 
male and female sub-samples and then the differences in the coefficient estimates, 
multiplied by a set of characteristics, is attributed to the wage differential for an 
individual with that particular characteristic.  Here, we deviate from this common 
practice by looking at the effects of gender and other covariates on different quantiles of 
the log wage distribution.
7 The effects of covariates on the location, scale and shape of 
the conditional wage distribution can be easily estimated using a quantile regression 
(QR) framework. This is a major advantage compared to the linear or least squares 
regression model, which yields only the effects on the location - the conditional mean of 
the distribution. Since the QR framework allows the characteristics to have different 
returns at different quantiles, at each point of the distribution it can control more fully 
for differences between men and women’s wages that are attributable to their 
characteristics.  
Following Buchinsky (1998), we specify the θth (0<θ<1)
8 conditional quantile of 
the log wage (w) distribution for the i-th individual (i=1,.., N) in wave t (t=1,..,Ti) as 
 Quantθ(wit|xit) = α(θ) +  xit
’β(θ)            (1) 
implying  
  wit = α(θ) + xit
’β(θ) + εθit          ( 2 )  
 with  Quantθ(εθ it|xit) = 0.    
For each sector, we estimate this model for men and women separately. Note 
that, if the underlying model were truly a location model - in the sense that the changes 
in explanatory variables caused only a change in the location of the distribution of w and 
                                                 
7  The linear conditional quantile regression model was first introduced by Koenker and Bassett (1978). For a recent 
survey of these models, see Buchinsky (1998). 
8  θ=0.5 refers to the Median.  
  9not in the shape of the distribution - then all the slope coefficients would be the same for 
all θ.
9  We use Stata 8 to estimate the coefficients of our QR model.  
  Below, we detail the method we have used to calculate the gender gap at the θth 
quantile due to differing returns adjusted for characteristics.  That is the gap measured as 
the difference in pay which women would face at the θth quantile if their distribution of 
characteristics were the same as that of men.
10  
 (b) Estimation Strategy and the Decomposition Method  
 
As noted above, we initially estimate the models separately by gender and country, and 
thus have 22 sets of estimations for each specification (Table 2 samples). Then we 
disaggregate by sector, and estimate the models separately by gender, sector and 
country, yielding 44 sets of estimations for each specification (Table 4 sub-samples). In 
the interests of space, and given the focus of our paper, we do not provide the complete 
set of estimates for each country. Instead we move straight to the calculations of the 
gender wage gap obtained from the QR model. Full details of all estimated effects for 
each country can be obtained from the authors on request. The calculations enable us to 
see whether or not there is a glass-ceiling effect over Europe and to determine if there is 
also a sticky floor.  
All models include the full set of other controls given at the bottom of Tables 2 
and 4 (including wave dummies). Table 2 and Figure 1 show the results from the wage 
gap calculations obtained from the pooled model, excluding controls for occupation and 
industry but including a dummy variable for private sector. Table 4 and Figure 2 (Figure 
                                                 
9 Quantile regression models are more general than simple linear regression model allowing for heteroskedastic errors, 
since the QR model allows for more general dependence of the distribution of w (the dependent variable) on the xs 
instead of just the mean and the variance of the conditional mean alone. 
10 We also calculated the gap using women’s characteristics as the reference. The results were very similar.  
  103) illustrate the results disaggregated by sector, where occupation and industry are 
omitted (included).  
We now provide more details of our calculations of the wage gaps. First, we 
estimated the quantile regressions for each gender (and by sector where necessary). Then 
we calculated the predicted wage at different parts of the wages distributions by gender 
(and sector). The wage gap in which we are interested measures the effect of different 
returns to men and women when men’s characteristics are used in the counterfactual 
calculations.  A positive wage gap implies that the returns to men’s characteristics are 
higher than those of women, and a negative gap implies the reverse.  Instead of using 
average characteristics of the male sample to calculate the counterfactuals, we follow the 
bootstrap procedure suggested by Machado and Mata (2000) and use the distribution of 
men’s characteristics to calculate the decompositions directly at particular quantiles of 
interest.
11  The procedure involves estimating marginal density of wages that are 
consistent with the estimated conditional densities given by (2) and the hypothesised 
distribution of characteristics.  In practical terms, this was carried out as follows: 
Step 1: Generate a random sample of size n= 5000 from a uniform distribution U[0,1]: 
θ1, …, θn.  This will give a series of numbers telling us which quantiles are to be 
estimated. 
Step 2:  For each θ from step 1, estimate the coefficients βm(θ) and βf(θ)  in equation (2) 
using the male dataset and female dataset respectively.  
Step 3:  Randomly draw 5000 males (with replacement) and use their characteristics to 
predict the wages using the estimated coefficients (βm(θ) and βf(θ))  from Step 2, 
                                                 
11 A similar procedure was used by Albrecht et. al (2003) and de la Rica et. al. (2005).  Machado and Mata (2005) 
Section 2.4 provides a detailed discussion of various methodologies that have been used in the calculations of 
counterfactual densities. 
  11generating two sets of predicted wages covering the whole distribution. Note, because 
the block-bootstrapping procedure is used to account for clustering at the individual 
level, there are more than 5000 observations in practice (see footnote 13). This enables 
us to calculate the marginal distribution of wages of men and the counterfactual 
marginal distribution for women if the distribution of their characteristics was the same 
as that of men’s characteristics, and the returns which are consistent with the estimated 
conditional distributions. 
Step 4:  Using the distributions calculated in Step 3, we estimate the wage gaps as the 
difference between the predicted wage at each quantile using the newly generated wage 
distribution for males and the counterfactual distribution for females. 
  Although we realise that individuals might self select into particular 
sector/industry/occupation, addressing the issue of self selection is beyond the scope of 
this dataset.  However, in order to see how the results change, we first present the results 
from the estimation that pools the sectors. We then separately estimate the wage gaps for 
each sector with and without the industry and occupational controls.   
(c) Estimates for the Combined Sample (Public and Private Sectors)  
The wage gap estimates obtained following the method just described are reported in 
Table 2, together with the percentage of raw gap that is explained by different returns.
12 
To facilitate comparison with the usual procedure, we report - in the first column of 
Table 2 - the gender wage gap estimated from ordinary least squares (OLS) using 
average male characteristics. In Figure 1, we present the estimated gender wage gap for 
each quantile of the log wage distribution along with the 95% confidence band around 
                                                 
12 The controls included in the equations are listed under Table 2. As well as human capital variables and job 
characteristics, they include year dummies to allow for cyclical effects on the gender wage gap at each quantile. 
Unfortunately, the ECHP contains no information about individual union membership or coverage by collective 
bargaining. 
  12these estimates.
13 Superimposed on the plots is a dotted horizontal line representing the 
wage gaps estimated from the mean regressions.  
The first interesting point to note from this table – and from Figure 2 – is that all 
the estimated gender wage gaps from the model are positive. Thus, in all countries, even 
assuming that men and women have identical distributions of characteristics, there is a 
gender pay gap across the wages distribution (due to differing returns). Notice also that 
these estimates are all significantly different from zero at the 1% or less significance 
level.  
To facilitate comparison, we summarise in Table 3 the results from the QR 
model estimates.  We first define the existence of glass ceiling if the 90
th percentile wage 
gap is higher than the estimated wage gaps in other parts of the wage distribution by at 
least 2 percentage points.  The sticky floor phenomenon is defined to exist if the 10
th 
percentile wage gap is higher than the 25
th percentile wage gap by at least 2 percentage 
points. These are summarised in columns [1] and [5].  Table 3 shows that there is a glass 
ceiling in five countries: Denmark, Finland, France, Italy and the Netherlands.   
Alternative definitions of a glass ceiling produce similar conclusions. Thus, if a wage 
comparison is made between the 90
th and the 75
th quantiles, Germany is additionally also 
found to have a glass ceiling. Britain is brought into this set of countries exhibiting a 
glass ceiling, if we define the existence in terms of a 90-50 difference.  Note also that the 
estimated wage gap is found to increase in Finland and the Netherlands all along the 
wage distribution. In contrast, the estimated wage gap decreases as one moves up the 
wage distribution in Spain.   
                                                 
13 Bootstrap sample of size 200 was used for the calculation of the standard errors. The sampling procedure used in the 
calculation also used block-sampling method to account for clustering at the individual level because of the panel 
nature of the dataset (Fitzenberger, 1998). 
  13There is also some evidence of sticky floors, but in only three countries using the 
10-25 difference – Austria, France and Italy– where women at the bottom (10
th 
percentile) are found to be more disadvantaged relative to those at the 25
th percentile. In 
general, the wage gap at the mean is found to provide a very incomplete picture of the 
differing returns faced by women and men at various points of the wages distribution.  
The proportion of the observed raw wage gap that is explained by the differences 
in returns to characteristics is shown in the square parentheses for each country in Table 
2.  A value greater than 100% implies that women have characteristics that compensate 
them for any “discrimination” – defined here as different returns to the same 
characteristics – that they face in the labour market.  For example, in four countries – 
Finland, France, Italy and Spain – women typically have better characteristics than men. 
The same is also true for Irish women earning in the top parts of the distribution, and for 
Belgian women in the bottom parts of the distribution. Next we turn to the estimates 
obtained from the disaggregated sub-samples, where public and private workers are 
examined separately.  
 
+The wage gap estimates obtained from the separate public and private sector sub-
samples are reported in Table 4, together with the percentage of the raw gap that is 
attributable to differing returns.
14 To facilitate comparison with the usual procedure, we 
report in the first column the gender wage gap estimated from ordinary least squares 
(OLS) using average male characteristics. In Figures 2 and 3, we present the estimated 
gender wage gap for each quantile of the log wage distribution along with the 95% 
confidence band around these estimates for the models without and with the industry and 
                                                 
14 See footnote 12. 
  14occupational controls.
15 Superimposed on the plots is a dotted horizontal line 
representing the wage gaps estimated from the mean regressions. The left hand side of 
Table 4 presents the results without industrial and occupational controls and we focus on 
these in our discussion. 
As for the pooled model, this table – and Figures 2 and 3 – show that all the 
estimated gender wage gaps are positive, both in the public and the private sector. Thus, 
in all countries, even if women had the same distribution of characteristics as men, they 
would still receive lower pay across the wages distribution. All the gaps are significantly 
different from zero at the 1% or less significance level. With the exception of Finland 
and the Netherlands, the estimated wage gaps are also generally higher in the private 
sector compared to the public sector.  The Finnish OLS public sector gender gap is 25% 
as compared with 21% in the private sector. And from the 25
th percentile upwards, the 
Finnish public sector gender gap exceeds that of the private sector. In the Netherlands, 
the OLS public sector gap is 13-14% in both sectors, with a similar increasing gap across 
the wages distribution.  
We next discuss in more detail how the wage gap varies across the wages 
distribution. To facilitate comparisons, we summarise in Table 5 the results from the QR 
model estimates reported in Table 4 using the same definitions as before (see Table 3). 
We focus on the models excluding the industry and occupation dummies. First, consider 
the public sector estimates, shown in the top panel of Table 4. There are eight countries 
– Austria, Belgium, Britain, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy and the Netherlands – 
where the gender wage gap is highest at the 90
th percentile of the wage distribution 
compared to other parts of the distribution, pointing to a widespread glass ceiling effect 
across Europe. Following our precise definition of the glass ceiling – that the 90
th 
                                                 
15 See footnote 13. 
  15percentile wage gap is higher than the estimated wage gaps in other parts of the wage 
distribution by at least 2 percentage points – Finland drops out of the set. However, it 
joins this group of countries when the glass ceiling is defined by the 90-50 differential 
(column [3]), and Germany also has a glass ceiling according to this definition.  Across 
the countries, the highest wage gap at the 90
th percentile is found in Finland, where it 
increases from about 15% at the 10
th percentile to about 32% at the 90
th percentile. The 
estimated wage gap is found to increase monotonically in Italy and the Netherlands too 
as we move along the wage distribution, although the increase is not as dramatic as in 
Finland.  
There is also some evidence of sticky floors. Using our earlier definition of a 
sticky floor as the situation where the 10
th percentile wage gap is higher than the 25
th 
percentile wage gap by at least 2 percentage points, we find that in three countries – 
Austria, France and Ireland – women at the bottom (10
th percentile) are more 
disadvantaged relative to those at the 25
th percentile. In general Belgium, Denmark, 
Germany and Spain are countries with relatively low wage gaps.  Once again, the wage 
gap at the mean is found to provide a very incomplete picture of the differing returns 
faced by women and men at various points of the wages distribution.  
Second, consider the private sector estimates, shown in the bottom panel of Table 
4 and also summarised in the bottom panel of Table 5. In contrast to the public sector, 
the private sector exhibits very large wage gaps.  Britain and Spain have a fixed gap of 
about 21-24% along the wage distribution.  A glass ceiling effect is found in six of the 
eleven countries: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy and the Netherlands. There 
is some evidence of sticky floors, but only in Austria, France, Germany and Italy, where 
the gap at the 10
th percentile is about 2-3 percentage points higher than at the 25
th 
percentile. 
  16We next turn to the proportion of the observed raw wage gap that is explained by 
the differences in returns to characteristics, shown in the square parentheses for each 
country in Table 4. In the public sector in five countries – Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy 
and Spain – women typically have better characteristics than men. The same is also true 
for Austrian and Finnish women earning in the top parts of the distribution.
16 In the 
private sector, Finland and Italy are the only countries where women have better 
characteristics than men in all parts of the distribution to compensate for the different 
returns that they would face in the labour market for the same characteristics as men.   
The estimates just discussed exclude controls for occupation and industry. We 
have focussed on these results because of the possibility that industry and occupation are 
endogenous. If, rather than being exogenous, industry and occupation are partly a choice 
made after labour market entry, then they should not be included in a counterfactual 
simulation which involves exchanging women’s characteristics for men’s. Estimates 
which do include endogenous industry and occupation should be interpreted as 
‘accounting’ for the gender wage gap rather than explaining it causally. For comparison 
with our main results, the right hand side of Table 4 presents estimates including 
occupation and industry. They are also pictured in Figure 3, and the right-hand panel of 
Table 5 summarises the pattern of glass ceilings and sticky floors according to the 
various definitions. Table 5 shows that using occupation and industry to try to account 
for the gender wage gap does not greatly change the previous conclusions that glass 
ceilings are widespread, especially in the public sector, and that some countries also 
have sticky floors. There are some notable exceptions to this: with the inclusion of 
industry and occupation, the glass ceilings in Belgium and Finland disappear. This could 
                                                 
16 The very large values in, for example, the public sector in Italy merit comment. They arise because there is 
essentially no gap in the raw data (Table 1, panel B), but a large gap when characteristics are controlled for, 
resulting in a high percentage figure due to differing returns. 
  17indicate that the glass ceilings in these countries primarily reflect occupational or 
industrial segregation, but we do not push this interpretation too far given the possible 
endogeneity issues. 
4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
4.1 The European institutional setting 
Our observed gender pay gaps showed that even if the distribution of characteristics 
were the same across gender, men and women received different returns across the 
wages distribution. We now speculate as to why the observed gender pay gaps in Europe 
are: (i) in some countries, larger at the top of the wages distribution (glass ceilings); and 
(ii) in some countries larger at the bottom of the wages distribution (sticky floors).  
Gender-specific policies - such as equal opportunities and anti-discrimination 
laws, parental leave provisions and the availability of child care – are likely to affect 
gender wage gaps, both mean gaps and gaps across the wages distribution. Gender wage 
gaps are also likely to be influenced by wage setting institutions that do not directly 
impinge on gender, such as those governing collective bargaining and minimum wages. 
Cross-country differences in such policies and institutions across the eleven European 
Union countries for which we have data may well contribute to observed variations in 
gender wage gaps. While clearly with just eleven observations we cannot hope to 
provide a conclusive test of the impact of different institutions on the gender pay gap, we 
are able to provide some interesting correlations between summary measures of various 
important institutions and our observed gender pay gaps. In what follows we use our 
estimated gaps for the combined samples (in which public and private sector workers 
were pooled). We do this because all of our summary measures of various institutions 
are only available country-wide and not disaggregated by sector. 
  184.2 Gender-specific policies 
First we consider how gender-specific policies might affect pay. Discrimination in the 
European Union is prohibited on grounds of gender, race (including nationality and 
citizenship) and - in Northern Ireland only - religion.
17 Nonetheless, although 
discrimination may be proscribed by legislation, whether or not it is still practised may 
depend on the effectiveness of its implementation and the willingness of individuals to 
take breaches to the courts. To the extent that only the more articulate and better 
educated are willing to take legal action against breaches of the law, we might expect the 
impact of these policies to work against glass ceilings as defined above.  
Parental leave provisions and state-provision of child care for under-school age 
children vary considerably across countries (OECD, 2001; Jaumotte, 2003).
18 These are 
likely to influence the behaviour of men and women differently and hence affect gender 
wage gaps. Blau and Kahn (2003) note that the expected impact of these policies is 
unclear a priori. On the one hand, women who are not subject to parental leave 
provisions might give up - or lose - their jobs on having a child, and may re-enter 
subsequently at lower level jobs providing shorter hours and lower pay.  And women 
who do have access to parental leave might have higher relative earnings through the 
fact that these policies preserve their ties with the firm and thereby increase incentives to 
invest in specific human capital. This will lead to a correlation between parental leave 
policies and higher female pay. We will term this the positive effect of parental leave 
                                                 
17   In light of the European Framework Directive, categories covered by anti-discrimination legislation were extended 
in 2003 to include religion and sexual orientation, and will be extended in 2006 to include the additional categories 
of age and disability.   
18 Specific paternity leave entitlements are still relatively uncommon and where they are found are typically of short 
duration (OECD, 2001:p.145). Of our 11 countries, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium and France have 3 days or less, 
while Denmark has 14 days. 
  19policies. But on the other hand, generous leave policies could increase women’s time out 
of workforce for childbearing, thus exacerbating the average gender pay gap for that 
group. This is the potentially negative effect of parental leave policies.  
Empirical research tends to find a positive effect of short leaves on women’s 
wages but a negative effect for long leaves (Ruhm, 1998; Waldfogel, 1998).  But why 
should these leave policies affect gender wage gaps across the wages distribution? We 
might expect a priori that women at the bottom might be less attached to the workforce, 
and so the positive impact of leave policies increasing women’s attachment to firms 
might dominate the negative effect outlined above. But ultimately it is an empirical 
question as to what effect dominates - and in which countries.  
What is the extent of statutory parental leave policies in the EU countries for 
which we have data? According to the OECD (2001: Table 4.7), the countries with the 
highest total duration of maternity/childcare leave (weeks) are Finland, Spain, France 
and Germany, followed by Austria. The lowest are found in the UK, followed by 
Ireland. There is also some evidence of extra-statutory provision of similar family-
friendly arrangements by firms. According to the OECD (2001:147) and Evans (2001), 
the highest coverage of extra-statutory provisions are in Austria and West Germany, 
followed by Italy, Greece, Spain. The Nordic countries plus Ireland and UK are the 
worst performers here.
19
                                                 
19 Evans (2001) identifies four main types of family-friendly arrangements by firms: Leave from work for family 
reasons; changes to work arrangements for family reasons; practical help with childcare and eldercare; and the 
provision of training and information. OECD (2001) summarizes these extra-statutory provision along 2 
dimensions: average % of women employees reporting extra family leave, and % women employees reporting 
provision/subsidies for child day care. The Netherlands has especially high levels of firm-provided day-care relative 
to amount of extra-statutory leave. 
  20We now consider formal childcare policies. These are likely to have a positive 
effect on women’s wages (since they are likely to increase women’s attachment to firms, 
thereby increasing incentives to make specific skills investments). They may also 
encourage women back to work earlier than might otherwise be possible. We would 
therefore expect them to reduce the gender pay gap, ceteris paribus. According to the 
OECD (2001), the countries with the largest proportions of children under 3 using 
formal childcare are Denmark at 64%, followed by Ireland at 38%, Britain at 34%, 
France at 29%  and Finland at 22%.  Four countries have fewer than 7% of the under-3s 
using formal childcare - Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Austria. 
Figure 4 presents three scatter plots illustrating the cross-country correlation 
between the OECD (2001) work-family reconciliation index and (a) sticky floors 
defined as the 10-50 pay difference; (b) glass ceilings defined as the 90-50 pay 
difference; and (c) the mean gender pay gap. The OECD work-family reconciliation 
index is the sum of indicators for the coverage of the under-3s in formal childcare, 
maternity leave, flexi-time, voluntary part-time and one half of the extra-statutory leave 
by firms indicator (see OECD, 2001; p152). The plots show that, across countries, the 
work-family index is negatively correlated with sticky floors and positively correlated 
with glass-ceilings. Thus countries with more “generous” work-family policies have a 
lower wage gap at the bottom of the wages distribution and a wider gap at the top. For 
example, Denmark and the Netherlands have the most liberal work-family policies and 
they have a big pay gap at the top and a small pay gap at the bottom of the wages 
distribution.    
We noted above that family-friendly policies could be a double-edged sword. On 
the one hand they might raise women’s relative earnings by preserving their ties with the 
firm, thereby increasing incentives to invest in specific human capital and leading to 
  21higher female pay. But on the other hand, family-friendly policies could increase 
women’s time out of workforce for childbearing, thus widening the average gender pay 
gap for that group. Our scatter-plot in Figure 4(b) – showing that the gender pay gap is 
higher at the top of the wages distribution in countries with generous family-friendly 
policies - suggests that the negative effect dominates at the top of the distribution in our 
sample of eleven European countries. 
What about women at the bottom of the wages distribution? Our scatter-plot in 
Figure 4(a) - showing that the gender pay gap is lower at the bottom of the wages 
distribution in countries with generous family-friendly policies - suggests that the 
positive effect dominates at the bottom of the distribution. Since women towards the 
bottom of the distribution might typically be less attached to the workforce, generous 
family-friendly policies might increase their attachment to firms. Certainly with our data 
this positive effect seems to dominate the negative effect outlined above.  
Albrecht et al (2003: 172), charted the extent - in a QR framework - of the 
Swedish glass ceiling and speculated as to its causes. They also found that gender 
differences in returns are the primary factor. They rejected the notion of a ‘taste-based 
explanation …[whereby] Swedish women prefer to work in family-friendly but low-
wage jobs’, on the grounds that gender differences arise from differences in rewards 
even after controlling for occupation. Instead they hypothesised that a more likely 
candidate explanation is the ‘work environment faced by Swedish women’ especially 
‘the Swedish parental leave policy and the daycare system’, which provide strong 
incentives to participate but not to commit strongly to a career.   
This is an interesting conjecture and one that is supported by our results for 
Denmark.
20 But the fact that we find the same glass ceiling effect across some other EU 
                                                 
20 See Pylkkänen and Smith (2004) for a detailed analysis of the impact of family-friendly policies on women’s 
parental leave behaviour in Sweden and Denmark. 
  22countries, with their very different parental leave policies and daycare systems, suggests 
that this cannot be the primary explanation. For example Italy has low levels of ‘work-
family reconciliation policies’ – and it too exhibits a glass ceiling.  
A second reason put forward by Albrecht et al (2003) for the Swedish glass 
ceiling phenomenon is the relatively high wages at the bottom of the wage distribution 
making it ‘very difficult for career-oriented women to hire household help or help with 
child care’, especially for the very young children under 12 months who cannot be 
admitted into daycare. For this reason, women might be found in less-demanding jobs 
and thus fall substantially behind men towards the top of the distribution. Thus cross-
country evidence should show a negative correlation between the magnitude of the glass 
ceiling and the dispersion of the wages distribution. This relationship is illustrated in 
Figure 5(b) for our sample of eleven countries, where we have measured wage 
dispersion by the 90
th-10
th percentile differential of log wages in the full sample of 
workers in each country. There is indeed a negative correlation that is consistent with 
this hypothesis.  
4.3 Pay-bargaining Institutions  
Next we consider pay-bargaining institutions that may not directly impinge on gender. 
While collective bargaining institutions, and the degree of coordination and 
centralization of wage bargaining, might not have direct gender effects, they could well 
have significant indirect effects. For example, trade unions may be less likely to 
represent the interests of their female electorate - who may be perceived as having a 
marginal attachment to the workforce – than of the male electorate (Booth and 
Francesconi, 2003). In addition, collective bargaining and associated institutions affect 
the wage structure in general. To the extent that the wages distribution is compressed, 
they may thus impinge indirectly on women’s wages and through this mechanism affect 
  23the gender pay gap.  Figure 5 suggests that this may indeed be the case. For those 
countries with greater wage dispersion (such as Britain, Ireland and Spain), the gender 
pay gap is widest at the bottom of the distribution and lowest at the top of the 
distribution.  
Countries with higher levels of unionisation and more centralized or coordinated 
bargaining tend to have lowest wage dispersion (Blau and Kahn, 1992, 1996, 2003; 
Boeri, Brugiavini and Calmfors, 2001). Centralized bargaining – and more coordinated 
bargaining - results in lower wage dispersion, and is thus likely to lower the gender pay 
gap ceteris paribus – perhaps especially at the bottom of the wages distribution. 
Moreover, in all the countries for which we have data, the female wage lies below the 
male across the entire wages distribution. Hence centralized pay bargaining systems that 
raise the minimum level of pay regardless of gender are also likely to lower the gender 
pay gap ceteris paribus.   
Although we can group our countries by both the extent of union density and of 
union coverage, we choose to focus only on coverage.
21 Countries in which coverage is 
at least 75% of the workforce are Austria, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and 
France (Boeri et al, 2001: p92). Countries with the highest levels of coordination of 
bargaining – both of unions and employers – are Austria and Norway, followed by 
Germany and Finland. The least coordinated are the UK and Ireland. 
Figure 6(a) reveals a positive correlation between the magnitude of the sticky 
floor and union coverage, while Figure 6(b) reveals a negative correlation between the 
magnitude of the glass ceiling and union coverage. This is consistent with unions 
                                                 
21 The extent of union recognition or coverage is a better measure of union power than union density, as argued in 
Booth (1995). In addition, the degree of coordination between unions, and and unions and employers, can also be 
crucial, as well as the degree of centralization of bargaining. See Boeri et al (2001) for a discussion and for detailed 
tables indicating the variation of these measures across the EU. 
  24representing the interests of females towards the top of the wages distribution but not 
towards the bottom, since the gender pay gap is higher at the bottom of the distribution 
and lower at the top in countries with high union coverage. 
Statutory minimum wages compress the bottom of pay distribution, and so are 
likely to reduce gap between men and women at the bottom (Dolado et al, 1996). 
Institutional pay compression – whether through unions or through minimum wages - 
may distort skills investment incentives.  However, a recent literature suggests that, in 
the presence of labour market imperfections inducing wage compression, firms may be 
willing to finance work-related training (see inter alia Stevens, 1994; Acemoglu and 
Pischke, 199, 2003; Arulampalam et al, 2004). If pay returns are reduced by pay 
compression, women have less incentive to stay in workforce when engaged in 
childrearing. Conversely, high wages floors might increase the likelihood women stay in 
workforce, because of the higher opportunity cost of time out, and they might therefore 
have higher levels of work experience and skills acquisition. Whether these effects on 
the gender pay gap vary across the wages distribution is ultimately an empirical issue. 
Certainly Figures 5 (a) and (b) show that countries with low wage dispersion have lower 
gender pay gaps at the bottom of the wages distribution and higher pay gaps at the top. 
This correlation is consistent with the hypothesis that women in countries with low pay 
dispersion are more likely to stay attached to firms at the bottom of the distribution.  
4.4 Other factors 
Of course other factors are also likely to be at work. Many labour markets are 
hierarchical, and promotions and appointments procedures can exacerbate gender pay 
gaps across the pay distribution.  While promotions are typically subject to well-defined 
procedures, especially in larger organisations, exactly where in the rank-specific salary 
scale a successful candidate is appointed can depend on individual negotiation skills or 
  25bargaining power, or employer discretion, in addition to experience. Booth, Francesconi 
and Frank (2005), using data on promotions from the British Household Panel Survey, 
show how women do not do as well financially out of promotions as do men, ceteris 
paribus.
22 If promotions procedures favour men rather than women towards the top of 
the wages distribution, then the gender pay gap might be bigger towards the top. 
Landers, Rebitzer and Taylor (1996) show, in their study of US law firms, how criteria 
for promotion like excessively long hours of work can exacerbate gender pay gaps 
towards the top of the lawyers’ wage distribution.  
Individuals are frequently appointed at a particular level of the rank of the 
relevant scale for their occupation or industry and then aim to work their way up the 
hierarchy.  While both promotions and pay are covered by anti-discrimination legislation 
and equal opportunities policies, there is scope for discretion – or discrimination - about 
the particular level within a rank to which an individual is appointed.   Thus if men are 
initially appointed at a higher starting salary (a higher rung) within a particular scale, 
then the gender pay gap might be bigger towards the bottom of the wage distribution - 
the sticky floor. Another hypothesis is that women towards the bottom might have less 
bargaining power or be more likely to be subject to firms’ market power than 
comparable men, due perhaps to unobservable family commitments or social custom 
whereby the man’s career takes precedence. Although we are unable to explore these 
hypotheses with our data, we mention them here for completeness since they may 
contribute to our findings. 
                                                 
22 Blackaby, Booth and Frank (2002), using data on the UK academic economists’ labour market, produce further 
evidence that promotions might exacerbate gender pay inequality. 
  264.5 Conclusions 
The analysis in this paper shows that, across our sample of eleven European Union 
countries, holding the distribution of characteristics constant, women are still paid less 
than men. The magnitude of the gaps – which can be attributed to differing returns – 
varies substantially across the different countries and across the wages distributions. We 
suggest that the considerable heterogeneity in EU countries’ institutions is likely to 
contribute to these differences, as illustrated by the simple correlations in Figures 4-6.  
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  31Table 1 - Raw Gender Wage Gap 

























A – POOLED 
Austria  0.580  0.234  0.268 0.236 0.210 0.194 0.201 
Belgium  0.538  0.100  0.100 0.100 0.074 0.080 0.150 
Britain  0.505  0.246  0.238 0.248 0.234 0.248 0.252 
Denmark  0.508  0.132  0.107 0.091 0.099 0.155 0.248 
Finland  0.496  0.184  0.112 0.119 0.170 0.243 0.266 
France  0.541  0.142  0.136 0.127 0.113 0.122 0.139 
Germany  0.570  0.204  0.230 0.189 0.178 0.206 0.227 
Ireland   0.551  0.201  0.253 0.233 0.209 0.166 0.129 
Italy  0.593  0.063  0.089 0.072 0.054 0.037 0.028 
Netherlands  0.597  0.183  0.151 0.146 0.155 0.196 0.232 
Spain  0.622  0.138  0.154 0.127 0.114 0.071 0.044 
B – PUBLIC SECTOR 
Austria  51.90  0.135   0.153   0.122   0.087   0.093   0.115  
Belgium  47.79  0.073   0.061   0.058   0.033   0.065   0.136  
Britain  34.88  0.212   0.213   0.185   0.216  0.197   0.217  
Denmark  33.59  0.114   0.128   0.085   0.105  0.119   0.175  
Finland  35.04  0.259   0.164   0.196   0.260   0.316   0.307  
France  45.06  0.116   0.112   0.095   0.110   0.128   0.139  
Germany  43.19  0.128   0.105   0.098   0.146  0.157   0.157 
Ireland   52.07  0.110   0.133   0.140   0.079   0.040   0.093  
Italy  51.29  0.006   -0.002   0.010  0.001   -0.021  0.046  
Netherlands  48.05  0.200   0.144   0.187  0.191   0.196   0.232  
Spain  52.65  0.054   0.083   0.068  0.058   -0.005  0.065  
C – PRIVATE SECTOR 
Austria  60.61  0.292   0.286   0.286   0.275   0.273   0.266  
Belgium  57.65  0.137   0.121   0.135   0.120   0.140   0.199  
Britain  56.43  0.306   0.269   0.304   0.309   0.326  0.311  
Denmark  63.63  0.134   0.104   0.115  0.091   0.167   0.240  
Finland  59.95  0.167   0.121  0.135   0.146   0.199   0.242  
France  58.79  0.202   0.180   0.156   0.170   0.201   0.228  
Germany  62.41  0.262   0.294   0.253   0.231   0.247   0.282  
Ireland   56.56  0.273   0.264   0.267   0.263   0.267   0.313  
Italy  63.83  0.153   0.145   0.111   0.130   0.146   0.194  
Netherlands  64.31  0.208   0.177   0.176   0.176   0.217   0.278  
Spain  65.39  0.230   0.252   0.206  0.205   0.244   0.207  
Notes:  (i) Raw wage gap is measured as the difference of the log male and log female hourly wage. The log wage was 
calculated from the ECHP variables as log (wage) = log (PI211MG * (12/52) / PE005A) = log (normal gross 
monthly earnings from main job including overtime * (12/52) / hours in main job including overtime). It was 
then deflated to 2001 prices using harmonised indices of consumer prices (HICP) from the Eurostat Yearbook 
2003. (ii) Except for the coefficients in italics, all coefficients are significantly different from zero at 5% level 
of significance.  
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Table 2  
Estimated Wage gap [percentage raw gap explained by different returns]  
Pooled Model without Industry and Occupational dummies 
 
  OLS 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 
  Austria  0.224 [96]  0.240 [89]  0.209 [89]  0.198 [94]  0.199 [103]  0.208 [104]
 Belgium  0.130 [130]  0.115 [185] 0.113 [152] 0.125 [254] 0.168 [145]  0.118 [87] 
 Britain  0.186
 [92]  0.211 [89]  0.217 [87]  0.223 [95]  0.226 [91]  0.236 [94] 
 Denmark  0.124
  [94]  0.089 [84]  0.080 [89]  0.102 [104] 0.154 [100]  0.210 [85] 
 Finland  0.229
 [124]  0.148 [132] 0.171 [144] 0.220 [129] 0.281 [116]  0.311 [117]
 France  0.197
 [139]  0.185 [136] 0.164 [129] 0.167 [147] 0.193 [157]  0.227 [163]
 Germany  0.177
 [87]  0.189 [82]  0.175 [93]  0.165 [93]  0.165 [80]  0.192 [84] 
 Ireland  0.210
 [104]  0.216 [85]  0.232 [100] 0.217 [104] 0.190 [114]  0.167 [130]
 Italy  0.159
 [253]  0.163 [184] 0.146 [203] 0.136 [254] 0.137 [368]  0.180 [635]
 Netherlands  0.137
 [75]  0.102 [68]  0.109 [75]  0.123 [79]  0.166 [85]  0.207 [89] 
 Spain  0.193
 [140]  0.220 [143] 0.209 [164] 0.186 [163] 0.177 [249]  0.167 [381]
Notes: (i) The model includes dummies for whether training was received in the last year, age, education, tenure, 
marital status, health status, any experience of unemployment since 1989, part-time status, fixed term and 
casual contracts, region (where possible), sector and year. Dummies were also included for cases where there 
were a very large number of missing values.  See the Appendix for further details. (ii) All coefficients were 




Summary of Table 2 Quantile Regression Results – Pooled Model 
 
  Glass ceiling measured  by




































Austria       3  3   21-24 
Belgium           11-17 
Britain    3       21-24 
Denmark  3  3  3       8-21 
Finland  3  3  3     Increasing  15-31 
France  3  3  3  3  3   16-23 
Germany    3  3  3     18-19 
Ireland           17-23 
Italy  3  3  3  3  3   14-18 
Netherlands  3  3  3     Increasing  10-21 
Spain       3   Decreasing  17-22 
Notes: (i). Glass ceiling is defined to exist if the 90th percentile wage gap is higher than the reference gaps by at least 
2 points.  (ii) Sticky floor is defined to exist if the 10th percentile wage gap is higher than the reference wage 
gap by at least 2 points. Table 4 – Estimated Wage gap (and percentage raw gap explained by different returns) 
  Industry and occupation excluded  Industry and occupation included 
  OLS 10% 25% 50% 75% 90%  OLS 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 
  PUBLIC SECTOR 
  Austria  0.136 [100]  0.114 [75]  0.080 [65]  0.085 [97]  0.103 [111] 0.139 [120] 0.163 [120] 0.173 [113] 0.119 [98]  0.118 [136] 0.124 [134] 0.146 [126] 
 Belgium  0.105 [143]  0.080 [130]  0.066 [114] 0.078 [240] 0.100 [154] 0.157 [116] 0.103 [141] 0.114 [185] 0.088 [152] 0.083 [254] 0.094 [145] 0.118 [87] 
 Britain  0.179 [84]  0.141 [66]  0.163 [88]  0.182 [85]  0.180 [92]  0.210 [97]  0.186 [88]  0.181 [90]  0.197 [106] 0.186 [87]  0.159 [81]  0.177 [82] 
 Denmark  0.097 [85]  0.083 [65]  0.073 [83]  0.089 [85]  0.118 [99]  0.162 [92]  0.086 [76]  0.092 [72]  0.079 [89]  0.076 [72]  0.092 [77]  0.127 [73] 
 Finland  0.251 [97]  0.151 [92]  0.188 [96]  0.250 [96]  0.305 [96]  0.319 [104] 0.202 [78]  0.139 [85]  0.153 [78]  0.199 [76]  0.244 [77]  0.276 [90] 
 France  0.168 [144]  0.160 [143]  0.138 [145] 0.146 [134] 0.173 [136] 0.230 [166] 0.140  [121] 0.178 [158] 0.133 [141] 0.113 [103] 0.124 [97]  0.152 [110] 
 Germany  0.094 [73]  0.062 [59]  0.060 [61]  0.088 [60]  0.117 [75]  0.119 [76]  0.151 [118] 0.150 [142] 0.137 [139] 0.139 [95]  0.127 [81]  0.104 [66] 
 Ireland  0.163 [148]  0.184 [138]  0.154 [110] 0.148 [188] 0.128 [319] 0.119 [127] 0.199 [180] 0.202 [152] 0.188 [134] 0.188 [239] 0.145 [363] 0.144 [154] 
 Italy  0.095 [1579] 0.060 [-3527] 0.059 [575] 0.068 [5246] 0.108 [-509] 0.185 [400] 0.118 [1971] 0.093 [-5454] 0.091 [894] 0.102 [7781] 0.123 [580] 0.185 [400] 
 Netherlands  0.135 [67]  0.104 [73]  0.122 [65]  0.138 [73]  0.151 [77]  0.183 [79]  0.128 [64]  0.098 [68]  0.115 [61]  0.123 [65]  0.135 [69]  0.170 [73] 
 Spain  0.101 [188]  0.115 [138]  0.109 [159] 0.117 [203] 0.071 [-1483] 0.079 [122] 0.096 [178] 0.117 [141] 0.101 [147] 0.106 [183] 0.081 [-1685] 0.082 [128] 
  PRIVATE SECTOR 
  Austria  0.236 [81]  0.249 [87]  0.222 [78]  0.212 [77]  0.213 [78]  0.226 [85]  0.285 [98]  0.299 [105] 0.279 [98]  0.272 [99]  0.258 [94]  0.233 [88] 
 Belgium  0.126 [92]  0.100 [83]  0.117 [86]  0.120 [100] 0.133 [95]  0.163 [82]  0.165 [120] 0.197 [164] 0.193 [143] 0.165 [137] 0.147 [105] 0.155 [78] 
 Britain  0.231 [76]  0.205 [76]  0.223 [73]  0.234 [76]  0.236 [72]  0.239 [77]  0.218 [69]  0.208 [77]  0.217 [71]  0.215 [70]  0.196 [60]  0.196 [63] 
 Denmark  0.132 [99]  0.089 [86]  0.097 [85]  0.114 [126] 0.158 [95]  0.199 [83]  0.122 [91]  0.112 [108] 0.114 [99]  0.104 [115] 0.116 [69]  0.155 [65] 
 Finland  0.214 [128]  0.154 [127]  0.172 [127] 0.205 [140] 0.248 [125] 0.283 [117] 0.218 [131] 0.197 [163] 0.210 [155] 0.217 [148] 0.209 [106] 0.198 [82] 
 France  0.194 [96]  0.179 [99]  0.155 [100] 0.161 [94]  0.190 [95]  0.229 [101] 0.159 [79]  0.153 [85]  0.136 [87]  0.141 [83]  0.151 [75]  0.169 [74] 
 Germany  0.181 [69]  0.209 [71]  0.185 [73]  0.167 [72]  0.164 [66]  0.189 [67]  0.196 [75]  0.207 [70]  0.200 [79]  0.201 [87]  0.200 [81]  0.212 [75] 
 Ireland  0.236 [86]  0.201 [76]  0.228 [85]  0.246 [94]  0.254 [95]  0.251 [80]  0.224 [82]  0.172 [65]  0.215 [81]  0.242 [92]  0.256 [96]  0.252 [80] 
 Italy  0.177 [116]  0.182 [125]  0.154 [138] 0.153 [118] 0.167 [115] 0.195 [101] 0.188 [123] 0.178 [123] 0.159 [143] 0.172 [132] 0.191 [131] 0.210 [109] 
 Netherlands  0.134 [64]  0.099 [56]  0.107 [61]  0.115 [65]  0.164 [75]  0.213 [77]  0.151 [73]  0.149 [84]  0.142 [80]  0.139 [79]  0.157 [72]  0.190 [69] 
 Spain  0.224 [97]  0.229 [91]  0.228 [110] 0.221 [108] 0.211 [87]  0.216 [105] 0.230 [100] 0.208 [83]  0.222 [108] 0.233 [114] 0.236 [97]  0.220 [107] 
 
Notes: (i) All models include dummies for whether training was received in the last year, age, education, tenure, marital status, health status, any experience of unemployment since 1989, part-
time status, fixed term and casual contracts, private sector firm size, region (where possible) and year. Dummies were also included for cases where there were a very large number of missing 
values.  See the Appendix for further details. (ii) All estimated wage gaps are significant at the 1% level. 
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  Industry and occupation excluded  Industry and occupation included 


















































































  PUBLIC SECTOR 
Austria  3  3  3  3  3   8-14    3  3  3  3   12-17 
Belgium  3  3  3       7-16   3  3  3  3   8-12 
Britain  3  3  3       14-21   3        16-20 
Denmark  3  3  3       7-16  3  3  3       8-13 
Finland     3     Increasing  15-32  3  3  3     Increasing  14-28 
France  3  3  3    3   14-23    3  3  3  3   11-18 
Germany     3       6-12       Decreasing  10-15 
Ireland      3  3    12-18       Decreasing  14-20 
Italy  3  3  3     Increasing  6-19  3  3  3     Increasing  9-19 
Netherlands  3  3  3     Increasing  10-18  3  3  3     Increasing  10-17 
Spain          7   - 1 2      3   8-12 
  PRIVATE SECTOR 
Austria    3  3  3  3   21-25        3  3  Decreasing 23-30 
Belgium  3  3  3     Increasing  10-16     3     15-20 
Britain        Increasing  20-24         20-22 
Denmark  3  3  3     Increasing  9-20  3  3  3       10-16 
Finland  3  3  3     Increasing  15-28         20-22 
France  3  3  3  3  3   16-23  3  3  3       14-17 
Germany    3  3  3  3    16-21         20-21 
Ireland          20-25         17-26 
Italy  3  3  3  3  3   15-20  3  3  3    3   16-21 
Netherlands  3  3  3     Increasing  10-21  3  3  3       14-19 
Spain          21-23         21-24 
Notes: (i). Glass ceiling is defined to exist if the 90th percentile wage gap is higher than the reference gaps by at least 2 points.  (ii) Sticky floor is defined to exist if the 10th percentile wage gap is 
higher than the reference wage gap by at least 2 points. 
 
  35 Figure 1  
Gender wage gap due to differences in returns evaluated at men’s characteristics.  
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Figure 1 Continued 
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  37 Figure 2 
Gender wage gap due to differences in returns evaluated at men’s characteristics. 
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  40 Figure 3 
Gender wage gap due to differences in returns evaluated at men’s characteristics.  
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 DATA APPENDIX:  
Selection of Estimating Samples and Sample Sizes    
 
The selection criteria are outlined in the text, and result in sample sizes as given in 
column [5] of Appendix Table A.1. The pooled, economy-wide models use the 
combined public and private sector samples for each gender. In the separate private 
and public sector analyses which include occupation and industry, the various 
industry and occupation dummies were combined in the following cases: (i) where 
there were small cell sizes (less than 1% of observations for both sexes); or (ii) where 
there was strong gender segregation (less than 1% of one sex in a cell). 
 
For the industry dummies, the base case in the public sector is administration, and 
the base case in the private sector is manufacturing. The table below shows how 
dummies were combined for each sector and country. For the public sector (where 
industry structure varies substantially across countries), the table lists the dummies 
combined and those included separately. Note that, when energy is combined with 
manufacturing, it is simply left in the base case. For the private sector, the table lists 
only combined dummies. The others are all included separately.  The full industry list 
is: agriculture (all observations dropped), energy, manufacturing, construction, retail, 
hotels, communications, finance, property, administration, education, social services, 
other, and missing industry. 
 
For the occupational dummies, the base case is unskilled. The most common form 
of occupational segregation is in the public sector, where there are very few female 
craft workers or operatives. These categories were combined with service and shop 
workers (this was preferred to combining them with the unskilled category). The full 
occupational list is: manager, professional, associate professional, clerical worker,   
service worker,  agricultural worker (all observations dropped), craft worker, 
operative, unskilled/other, missing occupation. 
 
Germany: to account for differences in wage determination between east and west in 
post-unification Germany, following a pooling test we interacted the following 
variables with a dummy variable for Eastern Germany: age, education, health status, 
any experience of unemployment since 1989, fixed term contract, occupation, firm 
size (private sector) and year. 

































Public Combined:  energy, 
manuf, constr, retail, 








2389, 2214  4.3, 4.2 
  Private Combined: (1) energy & 
manuf; (2) admin, educ 
& social. 
  6469, 4205  4.1, 3.6 
Belgium 
 
Public Combined:  energy, 









2257, 2466  4.2, 4.0 
  Private Combined: (1) energy & 
manuf; (2) admin & 
educ. 
  4271, 3137  3.8, 3.6 
Britain  Public Combined:  energy, 
manuf, constr, retail, 








2099, 3918  4.4, 4.1 
  Private  Combined: admin and 
educ. 
  8980, 6934  3.8, 3.6 
Denmark 
 
Public Combined:  energy, 
manuf, constr, retail, 








1984, 3922  4.1, 4.0 
  Private Combined: (1) energy & 
manuf; (2) admin, educ 
& social. 
  5169, 2955  4.0, 3.8 
Finland 
 
Public Combined:  energy, 









2240, 4153  3.7, 3.5 
  Private Combined: (1) energy & 
manuf; (2) admin, educ 
& social. 
  5413, 3616  3.3, 3.2 
France 
 
Public Combined:  constr,  retail 
& hotel. 








4114, 5017  4.2, 4.1 
  Private Combined: (1) energy & 
manuf; (2) admin & 
educ. 
  10309, 7227  3.8, 3.6 
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Country   Sector   Industry dummies  Occupation 
dummies 
Final no. of obs 







Public Combined:  energy, 
manuf, constr, retail, 








3572, 4698  4.6,4.2 
  Private Combined: (1) energy & 
manuf; (2) admin, educ 
& social. 
  13335, 8031  4.3, 4.8 
Ireland 
 
Public Combined:  energy, 









2113, 1945  3.9, 3.6 
  Private Combined: (1) energy & 
manuf; (2) admin, educ 
& social. 
  4684, 3597  3.2, 3.0 
Italy 
 
Public Combined:  constr,  retail, 
hotel, finance, property. 










4638, 4404  4.2, 4.5 









Public Combined:  energy, 
manuf, constr, retail, 
hotel, comms & finance. 
Separate: property, 





3125, 3378  4.8, 4.3 
  Private  Combined: admin & 
educ. 
  10491, 5821  4.6, 3.9 
Spain 
 
Public Combined:  energy, 
manuf, constr, retail, 











3155, 2837  4.1, 3.9 
  Private  Combined: admin, educ 
& social. 
  11790, 6241  3.4, 2.9 
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